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55 
My Favorite Case to Teach: A Literal “Gateway” for 
Students to Learn Contract Formation, Contract 
Terms, and Legal Realism 
Daniel Keating
*
 
INTRODUCTION 
I am now convinced that my favorite case to teach is Judge Frank 
Easterbrook’s opinion in Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc.
1
 That case was 
decided almost twenty years ago and I included it in the first edition 
of my Sales casebook when it was published in 1998.
2
 In what it is 
now its sixth edition, I still include Gateway 2000 in the assignment 
on the process of sales contract formation. I do so because the case 
offers a wonderful mix of both narrow and broad issues for any 
student learning Article 2 under the Uniform Commercial Code 
(UCC or the Code). 
Before categorizing and explaining these narrow and broad issues, 
I need to add a separate and more personal reason for why I love to 
teach this case. Frank Easterbrook was a faculty member at the 
University of Chicago Law School when I was a student there in the 
mid-1980s. Although I never took a course from him, his brilliance as 
a teacher, scholar, and jurist was legend among my classmates. 
Nevertheless, I disagree with his decision in Gateway 2000. When I 
was a law student in my early twenties, I never would have imagined 
that I would someday be in a position where I could confidently 
disagree with someone whose intellect I respect so much. 
 
 * I would like to thank the following people for helpful comments on an earlier draft of 
this Essay: Adam Badawi, Scott Baker, Greg Barton, Bill Barrett, Michael Greenfield, David 
Lander, Sandy Meiklejohn, Russell Osgood, and Joe Russell. 
 1. 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 2. DANIEL L. KEATING, SALES: A SYSTEMS APPROACH 40–44 (1998). 
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Of course, just because I disagree with Judge Easterbrook 
“confidently” doesn’t mean that I am right.
3
 My disagreement, 
however, does allow students to think hard about who they think is 
right, based on their reaction to Judge Easterbrook’s opinion, my 
questions, and the words of UCC Article 2. Through the years, there 
are always some students who hate it when they find a case included 
in the casebook that is “wrong.” As one student once put it, “[t]he 
UCC is confusing enough. Can’t you just include cases that you agree 
with?” Well, mostly I do. Even still, I include Gateway 2000 in my 
casebook and in my course because of the excellent lessons that it 
contains for students both about the substantive law of the sales of 
goods, and about larger policy issues involving legal realism that are 
just as important for students to see. 
The facts of Gateway 2000 are mercifully simple. As Judge 
Easterbrook puts it so succinctly in the very first paragraph of his 
opinion: 
A customer picks up the phone, orders a computer, and gives a 
credit card number. Presently a box arrives, containing the 
computer and a list of terms, said to govern unless the 
customer returns the computer within thirty days. Are these 
terms effective as the parties’ contract, or is the contract term-
free because the order-taker did not read any terms over the 
phone and elicit the customer’s assent?
4
 
The term at issue in this case is an arbitration clause that was 
included in Gateway’s list of terms, located in the box containing the 
computer. The customers, Rich and Enza Hill, waited more than 
thirty days after delivery to complain about the computer’s 
performance. They sought to sue Gateway in federal court as a 
racketeer under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Originations Act 
 
 3. If nothing else, I do have some company regarding my disagreement with the case. A 
Westlaw search of the case indicates that twenty-six different cases have cited or discussed the 
case with “negative treatment.” See, e.g., Klocec v. Gateway, 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1339 (D. 
Kan. 2000) (declining to follow Hill v. Gateway’s claim that section 2-207 cannot apply in a 
case involving just one form); DeFontes v. Dell, Inc., 984 A.2d 1061, 1070 (R.I. 2009) (noting 
various other courts that reject Hill v. Gateway’s view of section 2-207 and the timing of 
contract formation). 
 4. Gateway 2000, 105 F.3d at 1148. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol53/iss1/11
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for mail and wire fraud.
5
 Gateway asked the district court to enforce 
the arbitration clause that was included among the terms in the box. 
The district court refused to do so, and Gateway appealed to the 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
6
 Judge Easterbrook 
disagreed with the district court and reversed, allowing Gateway to 
enforce the arbitration clause. 
I. SUBSTANTIVE SALES OF GOODS ISSUES 
For a sales of goods teacher, this is a fantastic case on the issue of 
sales contract formation. What makes it such a great case is that it 
reminds the students that oftentimes the question of contract 
formation is not so important in its own right. Instead, this is an 
example of a case where contract formation is important only to the 
extent that the timing of contract formation will dictate what the 
terms of the contract will be. That was clearly the situation in 
Gateway 2000, where timing rather than the existence of contract 
formation was the key issue. In Gateway 2000, it would have been 
difficult for either side to argue that there was no contract formation 
at all by the time the Hills voiced their complaints to Gateway about 
the computer. After all, Gateway had shipped the computer and the 
Hills had accepted and paid for the computer. If that is not at least a 
contract by conduct, then what would be? 
The critical question around formation in Gateway 2000 was not 
whether formation occurred, but when it occurred. The answer would 
then determine which terms would or would not be part of the sales 
contract. If the contract was not formed until the Hills failed to reject 
the computer within thirty days of delivery, then arguably all of the 
terms in the computer box would be binding on the Hills. On the 
other hand, if formation took place at an earlier point in time—for 
example, during the phone call when the Hills ordered the computer, 
or even at the point when Gateway shipped the computer—then 
probably the terms in the computer box would not govern this 
contract. 
 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
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Whenever I cover this case in my Sales class, I begin by asking 
my students when, in their view, Judge Easterbrook believes that the 
sales contract in Gateway 2000 was formed. This question is 
something of a warm-up for whoever I call on that day. That is 
because anyone who reads this opinion can readily see that Judge 
Easterbrook thinks that this contract was formed when the Hills failed 
to reject the computer thirty days following delivery of the computer. 
This is where I push the students a little harder: If that is when Judge 
Easterbrook believes formation took place here, then what exactly 
did he view as the offer and acceptance in this case? 
Judge Easterbrook is not completely clear on this issue, but it is 
clear that he does not view the Hills’ phone order as constituting an 
“offer” to purchase the computer. Instead, he seems to view 
Gateway’s shipment of the computer as the offer (or perhaps a 
counteroffer to the Hills’ offer to purchase?). He then sees the Hills’ 
failure to return the computer within thirty days as an acceptance by 
default by the Hills. Interestingly, Judge Easterbrook does not cite 
UCC Article 2 for this view of what constitutes the offer and 
acceptance in this case. Instead, he cites his own previous opinion in 
the case of ProCD v. Zeidenberg,
7
 decided a year earlier, for the 
proposition that “terms inside a box of software bind consumers who 
use the software after an opportunity to read the terms and to reject 
them by returning the product.”
8
 He also cites a case involving 
consumers who are bound by terms printed on a cruise-ship ticket, 
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute,
9
 even though cruises are not 
governed by UCC Article 2.
10
 
I then direct my students to look at U.C.C. § 2-206(1)(b). That 
section says that “[u]nless otherwise unambiguously indicated by the 
language or circumstances, an order or other offer to buy goods for 
prompt or current shipment shall be construed as inviting acceptance 
either by a prompt promise to ship or by the prompt or current 
 
 7. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 8. Gateway 2000, 105 F.3d at 1148.  
 9. 499 U.S. 585 (1991). 
 10. Gateway 2000, 105 F.3d at 1148–49. See U.C.C. § 2-102 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. 
LAW COMM'N 2014) (providing that UCC Article 2 applies to “transactions in goods”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol53/iss1/11
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shipment of conforming or nonconforming goods.”
11
 Interestingly, 
Judge Easterbrook does not mention section 2-206(1)(b), not even to 
explain why it would not apply in this case. This is rather curious 
given that Gateway 2000 does, after all, involve a “transaction in 
goods” that would normally be subject to the provisions of UCC 
Article 2.
12
 
After my students have had a chance to read from section 2-
206(1)(b) with their own eyes, I then pose this question: Why 
couldn’t it be said that pursuant to section 2-206(1)(b), Gateway’s 
shipment of the computer and processing of the Hills’ payment via 
credit card constituted an acceptance of the Hills’ telephone offer to 
purchase the computer? If Gateway made a “prompt promise to ship” 
during the phone call (which seems highly likely under the 
circumstances), why could it not be said that Gateway accepted the 
Hills’ offer to purchase even before shipping the computer, at least 
according to the plain language of section 2-206(1)(b)? In the many 
years that I have taught this case, I have never had a student come up 
with a reason (or even a bad one!) why section 2-206(1)(b) would not 
apply to this situation. Nor have I ever had a student suggest why, if 
section 2-206(1)(b) does indeed apply, formation of the contract 
could have taken place any later than Gateway’s act of shipping the 
computer to the Hills. 
Once students have opened their eyes to a path completely 
different from that taken by Judge Easterbrook for considering when 
contract formation took place, they can then appreciate the 
connection between the timing of formation and the determination of 
which terms will govern the contract. I ask the students at this point 
to assume, contrary to Judge Easterbrook’s assumption about the 
timing of formation, that the contract was formed during the phone 
call in which the Hills placed their order for the computer and 
Gateway promised to fulfill it. After all, I remind the students, there 
did not seem to be any “unambiguous indicat[ion]” that it should be 
otherwise, to use the words of section 2-206(1)(b). In light of this 
new assumption about when contract formation took place, I ask my 
 
 11. U.C.C. § 2-206(1)(b) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2014). 
 12. U.C.C. § 2-102 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2014) (“[u]nless the context 
otherwise requires, this Article applies to transactions in goods”).  
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students: What would be the terms of the Hills’ contract with 
Gateway? 
For this oral contract entered into over the phone, the only 
definitive terms would be the model of the computer, the price of the 
computer, and the approximate shipment date. That raises the 
question for students whether a contract with so few definitive terms 
can qualify as an enforceable contract at all. This is where 
U.C.C. § 2-204(3) comes to our rescue: “Even though one or more 
terms are left open a contract for sale does not fail for indefiniteness 
if the parties have intended to make a contract and there is a 
reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy.”
13
 Here 
we would seem to have a “reasonably certain basis for giving an 
appropriate remedy” even if all we know for certain are the price, the 
type of goods, and the delivery term.  
But what about other terms—terms like “mode of dispute-
resolution”? This is where UCC Article 2 provides gap-fillers for the 
parties, in situations where the parties have not specified a particular 
term by the time of contract formation. The UCC gap-filler for mode 
of dispute-resolution is litigation, not arbitration.
14
 Therefore, under 
this approach to the timing of contract formation, Gateway’s 
arbitration term would not become part of the contract. 
Staying with my UCC-based approach to this case, I then suggest 
to the students that another possible way to consider this case is under 
U.C.C. § 2-207, the infamous “battle of the forms” section of Article 
2. To his credit, Judge Easterbrook does mention section 2-207, 
although he summarily dismisses the possibility that it might apply to 
these facts. Pointing again to his own opinion in the ProCD case, 
Judge Easterbrook reiterates his point there that “when there is only 
one form, sec. 2-207 is irrelevant.”
15
 In response to this argument by 
Judge Easterbrook, I ask my students to read the first few sentences 
of Official Comment 1 to section 2-207. That Comment reads in 
relevant part: “This section is intended to deal with two typical 
 
 13. U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2014).  
 14. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2014) (“If the 
court as a matter of law finds. . .”) (emphasis added). 
 15. Gateway 2000, 105 F.3d at 1150 (quoting ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 
(7th Cir. 1996)). 
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situations. The one is the written confirmation, where an agreement 
has been reached either orally or by informal correspondence 
between the parties and is followed by one or both of the parties 
sending formal memoranda embodying the terms so far as agreed 
upon and adding terms not discussed.”
16
 
I point out to my students that, in order for section 2-207 to apply 
in Gateway 2000 under the Official Comment 1 scenario, we have to 
assume that the offer and acceptance of this contract took place over 
the phone prior to Gateway’s shipment of the computer. Then we 
would have the necessary “agreement reached orally” referred to in 
Comment 1, followed by Gateway’s written confirmation in the form 
of terms in the box. If instead we assume that Gateway’s acceptance 
of the Hills’ offer to purchase the computer was Gateway’s act of 
shipping the computer rather Gateway’s “prompt promise to ship,” 
then section 2-207 would not apply. That is because we would then 
lack the necessary oral agreement required under Official Comment 1 
to section 2-207, and instead we would have to analyze the case 
solely under section 2-206. But note that even if section 2-207 does 
not apply in such a case, its inapplicability will not be for the reason 
given by Judge Easterbrook. Contrary to what he says about the 
scope of section 2-207 in his opinion, Official Comment 1 is very 
clear that section 2-207 can indeed apply in a case where you have an 
oral contract followed by a single written confirmation. 
I then ask my students to assume for the moment that we do have 
a section 2-207 case here. In other words, I ask them to assume (not 
unreasonably) that an oral contract was formed during the phone call, 
based on the combination of the Hills’ oral offer to purchase the 
computer and Gateway’s “prompt promise to ship.” The “formal 
memoranda” referred to in Official Comment 1 would then be the 
written terms that are included in the computer box. If that is our 
working assumption, I ask my students: What would happen to 
 
 16. U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 1 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2014) (emphasis 
added). Although the Official Comments to the UCC are not “the law” like the statutory 
provisions themselves, most courts defer to what the drafters have said in the Comments. Or, at 
least if a judge disagreed with a particular Official Comment, he or she would typically explain 
why. Furthermore, the text of section 2-207(1) itself refers to additional terms contained in a 
“definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirmation [singular],” 
suggesting in the text that a single confirmation could trigger application of section 2-207. 
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Gateway’s arbitration clause (and to any other new terms that are 
included in Gateway’s confirmation memoranda in the box)? 
This exercise gives students a chance to do a fairly 
straightforward application of section 2-207(2), which tells us how to 
handle additional terms that appear in a single confirmation of an 
already-concluded oral contract. Because the Hills are not merchants, 
the additional terms would remain mere “proposals”
17
 and would not 
become part of the contract unless the Hills specifically and 
affirmatively agreed to them, which obviously did not happen here. 
Any argument that a pair of non-merchants like the Hills could agree 
by default to additional terms via a “no objection” route would not be 
tenable under the language of section 2-207(2). Indeed, that 
subsection was drafted to obviate that very argument in these 
situations involving parties sending boilerplate forms which claim 
that their additional terms will govern the contract in the absence of 
specific objection to those terms. 
As you might imagine, students can see by this point in my 
discussion of Gateway 2000 that whether we use section 2-206(1)(b) 
or section 2-207, the result is the same: the arbitration clause does not 
become part of the contract, which is exactly the opposite result 
reached by Judge Easterbrook.
18
 Students can also see by this point 
that section 2-206(1)(b) ought to apply to this case, even though the 
reasons for its supposed inapplicability are never even mentioned in 
the opinion. Similarly, students can see that the brief reason given in 
the opinion for the non-application of section 2-207 is directly 
contradicted by Official Comment 1 of that section. And this is where 
the class gets really interesting, because this is where the case teaches 
my students some broader policy issues about the law and legal 
realism that go beyond the mere substance of UCC Article 2.  
 
 17. U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2014). 
 18. Even if this case were considered a “sale on approval” under section 2-326(1)(a) 
because of the Hills’ thirty day option to return the computer, that does not change the analysis 
under section 2-206 or section 2-207. That is because neither section 2-206 nor section 2-207 
creates an exception to its usual rules for a case involving a sale on approval. U.C.C. §§ 2-206 
to -207, -326(1)(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2014). 
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II. BROADER ISSUES OF LEGAL REALISM 
The first “legal realist” lesson that students get to see with 
Gateway 2000 is that sometimes (maybe oftentimes!) judges work 
backwards to justify a result which they believe to be right in a 
particular case. It is pretty clear in this case that Judge Easterbrook 
believes that a world in which Gateway would be precluded from 
using a “no objection” default mode to creating binding terms on its 
buyers would be a much less efficient and less desirable world. As 
Judge Easterbrook explains in his opinion: 
Payment preceding the revelation of full terms is common for 
air transportation, insurance and many other endeavors. 
Practical considerations support allowing vendors to enclose 
the full legal terms with their products. Cashiers cannot be 
expected to read legal documents to customers before ringing 
up sales. If the staff at the other end of the phone for direct-
sales operations such as Gateway’s had to read the four-page 
statement of terms before taking the buyer’s credit card 
number, the droning voice would anesthetize rather than 
enlighten many potential buyers. Others would hang up in a 
rage over the waste of their time. And oral recitation would not 
avoid customers’ assertions (whether true or feigned) that the 
clerk did not read term X to them, or that they did not 
remember or understand it. Writing provides benefits for both 
sides of commercial transactions. Customers as a group are 
better off when vendors skip costly and inefficient steps such 
as telephonic recitation, and use instead a simple approve-or-
return device. Competent adults are bound by such documents, 
read or unread.
19
 
I suspect that—in addition to the parade of horribles Judge 
Easterbrook suggests above—there is another reason why he felt 
comfortable enforcing the arbitration clause in this case. I believe that 
Judge Easterbrook would view an arbitration clause as not such an 
unusual (or in his mind unreasonable) clause to enforce, even against 
 
 19. Gateway 2000, 105 F.3d at 1149. 
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a consumer buyer. Others, such as plaintiff class-action lawyers, 
might disagree with that conclusion. I have created a set of problems 
in my casebook that push the students on this point. In these 
problems, I change the facts of the Gateway 2000 case to include 
other (arguably more onerous) terms, to see if the students think that 
Judge Easterbrook would be comfortable enforcing those. For 
example, what if the terms in the box said that the buyers, absent 
return of the computer in thirty days, hereby agree not to use any 
other printer with the computer except for a special Gateway printer 
that they can buy from Gateway? What if the terms say that the seller 
is not responsible for any consequential damages? What if the terms 
say that the buyers’ sole remedy for any defects in the computer is 
that the buyers will receive a special Gateway baseball cap for their 
troubles?
20
 
My point in pushing the students on these alternative scenarios is 
that even if you believe that there is nothing unusual or onerous about 
this arbitration clause, there is a broader doctrine represented by this 
case. That doctrine would allow the seller to slip into the terms in the 
box some other provisions that might shock the average buyer.
21
 I 
also pose a second hypothetical in my problem set that challenges the 
students on the implications of Judge Easterbrook’s conclusion about 
the timing of contract formation.
22
 Judge Easterbrook’s opinion holds 
that the contract was not formed until after the Hills had the computer 
for thirty days and failed to object to the terms in the box. In my 
hypothetical, I ask students to imagine that following the Hills’ phone 
conversation with Gateway, Gateway calls the Hills back one week 
 
 20. See generally DANIEL L. KEATING, SALES: A SYSTEMS APPROACH 69–70 (6th ed. 
2016). 
 21. In a memorable series of comic strips from January of 1997, Scott Adams, the author 
of the Dilbert strip, posits a scenario where Dilbert failed to read closely the software license for 
the Microsoft software that he purchased. As a result, Dilbert inadvertently has agreed to be Bill 
Gates’ towel boy in Gates’ huge new house. Even under Judge Easterbrook’s view of things, 
presumably a seller would still be bound by such UCC limits as unconscionability and the 
reasonableness of a seller’s limits on a buyer’s remedy. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-719 cmt. 1 (AM. 
LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2014) (“it is of the very essence of a sales contract that at 
least minimum adequate remedies be available”). This limitation would seem to invalidate my 
suggested baseball-cap remedy as an unenforceable exclusive remedy.  
 22. See generally DANIEL L. KEATING, SALES: A SYSTEMS APPROACH 69–70 (6th ed. 
2016). 
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later and tells the Hills that the Hills now must pay ten percent more 
than the price quoted over the phone if they still want the computer. I 
then ask whether Gateway would be able to enforce such a condition 
on the sale of the computer. 
At first, the students are outraged at the notion that Gateway could 
legally enforce such a condition like that after the phone conversation 
in which the Hills placed their order and Gateway promised to send 
the computer. But then I remind the students that Judge Easterbrook 
held that the contract was not formed when Gateway took the Hills’ 
order over the phone and agreed to ship the computer. Therefore, 
Gateway could theoretically back out of this contract with impunity; 
alternatively, Gateway could change the terms of the deal that the 
Hills thought that they had struck with Gateway. Or, even if the basic 
terms agreed to over the phone could not be changed by Gateway, the 
“terms to come” could be so onerous as to make the deal completely 
unattractive to the would-be buyers. 
After all, if Gateway’s shipment is considered to be a counter-
offer to the Hills’ phone offer to purchase the computer (rather than 
an acceptance of the Hills’ offer to purchase, as section 2-206(1)(b) 
would seem to indicate), then Gateway could simply change the 
terms of that counteroffer prior to acceptance of the counteroffer by 
the Hills, absent some detrimental reliance on the counteroffer shown 
by the Hills. And remember, under the Judge Easterbrook view of 
this contract, the Hills’ acceptance of Gateway’s counteroffer (which 
counteroffer took the form of shipment of the computer with terms in 
the box) will not take place until the Hills fail to return the computer 
within thirty days of delivery. My basic point with this hypothetical 
in my casebook problem is that, if nothing else, these possibilities do 
not comport with most consumers’ common-sense understanding of 
when the sales contract has been formed here. 
Judge Easterbrook’s parade of horribles certainly does present an 
unattractive alternative universe that might prevail if a court did not 
come out the way he does in this case.
23
 On the other hand, is an 
inefficient outcome reason enough to ignore what the legislature has 
said about a particular matter, in this case through the provisions of 
 
 23. See supra note 19. 
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UCC Article 2? That raises for students the second “big picture” 
legal-realist observation, this one involving the separation of powers 
between courts and legislatures as it sometimes works in practice.  
All of the courses that I teach are Code courses, and yet in all of 
those classes the students read assigned books that include a lot of 
cases, rather than simply excerpts and explanations of Code 
provisions. During the first class of every course that I teach, I try to 
help students to understand the role that cases play in a Code course. 
First, I tell my students, cases can give them some excellent real-life 
examples of how the Code provisions work in practice. Second, I 
remind the students that as wise as these Code drafters were and as 
comprehensive as they tried to be, there will invariably be matters 
that arise in commerce that are simply not covered by the Code’s 
provisions. Also, there is often Code language that is subject to more 
than one interpretation. In those cases, we need a court to go beyond 
just “applying” the Code, and instead to fill gaps in Code coverage or 
to interpret an ambiguous provision of the Code. 
Most 1L students could tell you that when a statute is clear as to a 
particular matter, the court’s job is simply to apply the statute as 
written, even if the court does not agree with the statute or with the 
outcome that it would yield with a given set of facts. This is where 
the separation of powers issue gets thorny, and where legal realism 
rears its head. Who gets to decide when a particular court is merely 
“interpreting” a statute rather than re-writing or ignoring it because 
the court doesn’t care for the result that would obtain with a 
straightforward interpretation of the statute? Practically speaking, it is 
going to be the court that makes this call, especially if the court is a 
federal court of appeals like we have in the Gateway 2000 case.
24
 In 
 
 24. Even a federal court of appeals, if it is sitting in diversity as the Seventh Circuit was in 
the Gateway case, is supposed to apply the state’s substantive law on a state-law issue like the 
interpretation of the UCC. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF 
FEDERAL COURTS § 58, at 396 (7th ed. 2011) (federal court’s job in diversity cases involving 
substantive state law is “not to choose the rule that it would adopt for itself, if free to do so, but 
to choose the rule that it believes the state court, from all that is known about its methods of 
reaching decisions, is likely in the future to adopt”). Yet Judge Easterbrook’s sole reference in 
his opinion to the substantive state law of either Illinois (the Hills’ state) or South Dakota 
(Gateway’s state) is limited to observing that “neither side has pointed us to any atypical 
doctrine that might be pertinent . . .” and offers no comment on whether a single form qualifies 
for the application of section 2-207. 105 F.3d 1147, 1149. Instead, he simply refers to his own 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol53/iss1/11
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theory, even a federal court of appeals can be reversed by the U.S. 
Supreme Court, but what are the odds that a given case will ever be 
heard by the Supreme Court? Similarly, in theory, a legislature that 
believed that courts were misapplying, misinterpreting, or just plain 
ignoring one of its statutory directives could re-draft the statute in a 
way that left no doubt how the statute should be applied to the facts 
of those kind of cases. But again, what are the odds that a legislature 
would take the time or have the necessary consensus to reverse 
legislatively what it believed was a misapplication of one its statutes? 
REALITY CHECK: HOW CAN A SELLER ENSURE THAT ITS TERMS 
PREVAIL? 
The third broader policy point that the Gateway 2000 case raises 
is a contract-theory question, rather than a separation-of-powers 
question. This is an age-old question of how the legal system ought to 
determine the non-immediate terms of a contract where, for whatever 
reason, the two parties have not sat down to negotiate and sign a 
written contract that outlines all of the non-immediate terms.
25
 The 
classic manifestation of this problem is captured in section 2-207's 
battle of the forms scenario, where a buyer and a seller agree to the 
purchase and sale of goods but don’t bother to negotiate and sign a 
unified written contract. This issue comes up in other ways as well, 
including most consumer retail purchases, whether in-person or 
online.  
This brings us back to Judge Easterbrook’s parade of horribles 
again. Do we want to live in a world where sellers, if they wish to 
protect themselves as to particular non-immediate terms that are 
important to them, will be forced to give lengthy recitations of 
contract terms either over the phone or in the checkout lane at the 
brick-and-mortar stores? This issue gives me a great follow-up 
question for students that tries to put them in the shoes of Gateway, a 
seller that clearly cares about its non-immediate term that would 
 
decision in ProCD, which similarly lacks any reference to the relevant state substantive law on 
that question. 86 F.3d 1447. 
 25. By non-immediate terms, I mean things like remedies and mode of dispute resolution, 
as opposed to immediate terms like price, quantity, quality, and delivery terms.  
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require arbitration as the mode of dispute-resolution. In my 
hypothetical, however, I tell my students to assume a world in which 
the judge in this case is me rather than Judge Easterbrook. If I am the 
judge, I remind them, then I will apply UCC Article 2 as I read it, 
especially section 2-206(1)(b) and section 2-207. If the students are 
now to imagine that the judge (me) will actually apply the provisions 
of Article 2 here, what exactly should Gateway say on the phone to a 
prospective buyer if Gateway does not want its computer shipment to 
count as an “acceptance” under Article 2 unless Gateway can be sure 
that all of its terms in the box will govern? 
My “solution” for Gateway, such as it is, does not necessarily 
require the full recitation of the four pages worth of terms contained 
in the box as Judge Easterbrook suggests. But my solution ends up 
sounding at least cumbersome if not somewhat wacky on its own 
terms, especially if Gateway wants to be completely certain that it 
can enforce its terms in the box: first, Gateway should record the 
telephone conversation; second, Gateway should tell the buyer that 
“we don’t accept your offer to purchase, but we will make a 
counteroffer to sell the computer you asked for but with additional 
terms inside the box that we will ship you”; and third, Gateway 
should say, “please read all of the terms in the box that we send to 
you and return the product within thirty days of receipt if you do not 
agree to accept all of terms of our counteroffer. Otherwise, you will 
have accepted our counteroffer, including all of our terms in the 
box.” 
Now, I cannot imagine that my “UCC-friendly” method of 
helping Gateway control the terms of its sale of a computer will end 
up improving the yield on its phone-order sales. Yet anything short of 
that method would likely risk having Gateway’s terms in the box not 
control, at least if I were the judge. In outlining this idiosyncratic 
process for Gateway, I do not mean to suggest that this is an efficient 
way for sellers to get the terms they want.
26
 All I am suggesting 
above is that some process like this is what the relevant statute, UCC 
Article 2, seems to require of the seller if the seller truly wants to 
 
 26. I am being agnostic for the moment about what is or is not efficient for Gateway to get 
what it wants.  
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ensure that it gets all of the terms it wants. If I were the judge, that is 
what I would be focusing on, rather than on my vision of how 
commerce could run most smoothly, especially if efficiency means 
ignoring or glossing over the words of the relevant statute. 
To conclude my coverage of Gateway 2000, I push students to 
consider other possible ways that Gateway could get the terms that it 
wants, once more assuming that I were the judge rather than Judge 
Easterbrook. One possibility is for Gateway to insist on getting the 
buyer’s signature as proof of the buyer’s agreement to Gateway’s 
various terms, instead of just relying on the no-objection presumption 
that leads to the buyer’s acceptance of all the seller’s terms. By 
insisting on the buyer’s signature in advance of the sale, the seller 
could ensure that the various non-immediate terms like arbitration 
would be specifically assented to by the buyer, making them so-
called “dickered terms” and taking them out of the realm of either 
section 2-206 or 2-207.  
Another approach for a seller like Gateway to get the terms it 
wants would focus on when Gateway accepts payment from the 
buyer. If Gateway processes the buyer’s payment over the phone 
when the buyer calls to order the computer, that would seem to 
reinforce the notion that the contract is formed at that point, which is 
not what Gateway wants with regard to enforcing its terms in the box. 
If Gateway were to wait until thirty days following the buyer’s 
receipt of the goods to process the buyer’s payment, that would seem 
more consistent with a scenario in which the buyer’s acceptance does 
not take place until the buyer fails to object to any of the terms within 
thirty days of receipt. One problem with this approach is that 
Gateway would probably fear (rightly) that this delay in processing 
the buyer’s payment might cause some buyers to keep the computer 
but never pay for it. 
Perhaps the simplest approach for Gateway to get the terms it 
wants in the Internet age is to stop accepting phone orders, and 
instead insist that all remote orders be processed online. If that is the 
route that Gateway takes, then Gateway can do a “clickwrap 
agreement” online for any potential buyers of its computers. 
Clickwrap agreements are generally upheld by courts if the agreed-to 
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terms are conspicuously displayed online before the buyer clicks the 
relevant “I agree” icon.
27
 Enforcing a clickwrap agreement would 
certainly be consistent with Judge Easterbrook’s insistence in 
Gateway 2000 that parties can be bound by contractual language that 
they did not bother to read. The difference, though, between this 
online scenario and what actually happened in Gateway 2000 is that 
formation arguably took place before the buyer had access to the 
relevant terms. In the standard clickwrap scenario, formation does not 
take place until after the buyer claims to have read the contract terms, 
and then clicks his or her assent. 
CONCLUSION 
Due to the rise of Internet commerce and the decline of phone 
orders, the practical significance of the Gateway 2000 holding is 
becoming less and less significant as time goes on. Nevertheless, I 
cannot imagine dropping this case from my Sales casebook or my 
Sales course in the foreseeable future. That is because I believe that 
the case still presents students with a fascinating range of substantive 
sales issues, along with a host of larger policy issues about how the 
legal system operates in practice. And on top of all that, Judge 
Easterbrook’s opinions are extremely well-written and fun to read—
even in the rare case when I think he got it wrong. 
 
 27. See, e.g., Fetija v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 837 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing 
numerous decisions upholding clickwrap agreements). See also Berkson v. Gogo, 97 F. Supp. 
3d 359 (E.D.N.Y. 2015); Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble, Inc., 763 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(where both courts focus on how conspicuously the online terms were presented to the potential 
purchaser). 
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